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JUSTICE AND THE GREY BOX OF RESPONSIBILITY
*
 
 
Abstract: Even where an act appears to be responsible, and satisfies all the conditions 
for responsibility laid down by society, the response to it may be unjust where that 
appearance is false, and where those conditions are insufficient. This paper argues 
that those who want to place considerations of responsibility at the centre of 
distributive and criminal justice ought to take this concern seriously. The common 
strategy of relying on what Susan Hurley describes as a ‘black box of responsibility’ 
has the advantage of not taking responsibility considerations to be irrelevant merely 
because some specific account of responsibility is mistaken. It can, furthermore, cope 
perfectly well with an absence of responsibility, even of the global sort implied by 
hard determinism and other strongly sceptical accounts. Problems for the black box 
view come in where responsibility is present, but in a form that is curtailed in one 
significant regard or another. The trick, then, is to open the box of responsibility just 
enough that its contents can be the basis for judgments of justice. I identify three 
‘moderately sceptical’ forms of compatibilism that cannot ground judgments of 
justice, and are therefore expunged by the strongest ‘grey box’ view. 
 
I. Introduction 
Attributions of responsibility are central to practices of punishing in the criminal law. 
During the past two decades several political theorists have suggested that 
responsibility should also be a key consideration in the allocation of benefits and 
burdens among citizens. Both types of practice can be construed as being based on 
                                                 
* This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedited version of an article published in Theoria. The definitive publisher-
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what I will call the responsibilitarian principle, which states that those who are 
responsible for bringing about some thing ought to be rewarded or punished according 
to the (moral or prudential) goodness or badness of that thing.
1
 The application of this 
principle to a matter of criminal justice is commonly known as retributivism. The 
relative of the general principle most discussed in political philosophy goes by the 
name luck egalitarianism. 
 The contrast between retributivism and luck egalitarianism extends beyond the 
fields in which they are applied. Those inclined to invoke the simple left-right 
political spectrum might note that, while retributivism is nowadays usually taken to be 
a conservative position on criminal justice, luck egalitarianism is, at least according to 
its advocates, a view firmly located on the liberal left. Luck egalitarianism’s critics 
might view that as a useful weapon in their arsenal. It is necessary, then, to observe 
that the egalitarianism of luck egalitarianism is at least a little more than a misnomer. 
For luck egalitarians combine the responsibilitarian principle with the equality default 
principle, which holds that all departures from equality must be justified on 
responsibility grounds.
2
 Retributivism appears to encompass a counterpart principle 
stating that in the absence of bad responsible acts, there should be no punishment.
3
  
 Retributivism and luck egalitarianism have been the subjects of much 
criticism, and there are similarities in the kinds of criticism the two views have faced. 
The most common objection to retributivism is that offenders’ responsibility for their 
crimes does not by itself say anything about how the law ought to respond.
4
 The claim 
                                                 
1
 This combines elements of H. L. A. Hart’s (1968, 231) principles of responsibility and 
proportionality; the third principle he lists, that of just requital, is specific to retributivism. 
2
 Hurley 2003, 153-4, 172. 
3
 Hart 1968, 9. Throughout this article ‘acts’ should be taken to include omissions. 
4
 Wootton 1963.  
 3 
is that the retributivist simply asserts that punitive action is the appropriate response 
to crime, when other responses – therapeutic intervention, for instance – are more 
appropriate, especially given the modern orientation towards preventing crime and 
away from punishing evil. Similar objections have been raised to luck egalitarianism. 
Why exactly does someone’s responsibility for an act that harms themselves or others 
make it legitimate for them to be disadvantaged relative to those whose acts have 
prudentially or morally good effects?
5
 The shift here reflects the differing scope of the 
two views under consideration: whereas retributivism is concerned only with 
punishing wrongs, luck egalitarianism is also concerned with rewarding action that 
has good effects. But in both cases it is objected that differential exercises of 
responsibility cannot justify differences in individuals’ benefits and burdens. We 
might call this the arbitrariness of reaction objection. 
Some of the critics of luck egalitarianism and retributivism also object to the 
notion that it is possible in theory and/or practice to reward and punish on the basis of 
any deep sense of responsibility. While it is of course entirely possible to use social 
institutions to ensure that certain acts are considered to be responsible ones, in the 
sense that they are treated as appropriate bases of reward and punishment, it is quite 
another to assert that such political and legal arrangements are sensitive to what 
people are actually responsible for in a metaphysically and/or morally significant way. 
Even if an act appears to be responsible, and satisfies all the conditions for 
responsibility laid down by society, the response to it may be unjust where that 
appearance is false, and where those conditions are insufficient. In other words, 
                                                 
5
 One specific form of this complaint is the ‘harshness objection’ (or ‘abandonment objection’) put 
forward by Elizabeth Anderson (1999) and other critics of luck egalitarianism. For discussion of this 
objection see Voigt 2007; Segall 2007; Knight 2009a, ch. 4, 6. 
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socially prescribed accountability is insufficient for responsibility (and the rewards 
and punishments that might justify). This is the arbitrariness of attribution objection. 
It is independent of, and in a way more fundamental than, the arbitrariness of reaction 
objection. An adherent might accept that there is nothing objectionable about reacting, 
even punitively, to genuinely responsible acts, but deny that such acts exist in general 
or in the cases under consideration. The most frequently cited general threat to such 
genuine responsibility comes from causal determinism – the view that all events and 
states of affairs, including human action, are causally determined by earlier events – 
and particularly from its combination with the view that responsibility is incompatible 
with such determinism, which combination is called hard determinism. But this is far 
from being the only way in which the connection between responsibility and 
retributive or luck egalitarian applications of justice might be undermined. 
In this article I argue that an appealing response to the arbitrariness of 
attribution objection, while successfully protecting retributivism and luck 
egalitarianism from the allegation of basing distributions on the mere façade of 
responsibility, only serves to expose responsibilitarianism to the arbitrariness of 
reaction objection and to conceptual confusion. I believe that retributivists and luck 
egalitarians alike should be concerned with a deep sense of responsibility, rather than 
with some more conventional notion that might be better described as accountability. 
But it turns out that the strategy of placing responsibility in a ‘black box’, and reacting 
to responsibility however that is best construed, results both in morally unjustified 
reactions and reactions that are not truly responsibilitarian.  
To demonstrate this, I consider several accounts of responsibility, paying 
special attention in each case to responsibility’s appropriateness as a fundamental 
ground for rewarding and punishing. There is a focus on this topic in legal 
 5 
philosophy, but political philosophy has barely considered it. This is unsurprising 
given that luck egalitarianism has dragged responsibility into the centre of discussions 
about distributive justice only in the last twenty years, whereas responsibility has been 
central to criminal justice for centuries. My arguments will therefore have more 
significance in relation to luck egalitarianism – that is, in showing how it can resist 
the arbitrariness of attribution objection while reacting to attributions of responsibility 
in a morally justified and conceptually clear way. A further objective is to bring out 
some basic similarities in the kind of responsibility required by retributivism and luck 
egalitarianism, a topic that is neglected in both legal and political philosophy.   
I begin by favourably comparing ‘black box responsibilitarianism’ – the form 
of responsibilitarianism that defines responsibility thinly, basing distributive and 
punitive responses on whichever account of responsibility appears to be most 
metaphysically and morally convincing – with the alternative ‘white box 
responsibilitarianism’, which defines responsibility thickly, responding only to a 
specific pre-defined account of responsibility. I show that the truth of hard determinist 
or regressive accounts of responsibility would not undermine the theoretical claims of 
black box responsibilitarianism, although it would severely harm the prospects of 
retributivism and luck egalitarianism as distinctive answers to practical problems 
(section II). I then address three versions of compatibilism – understood as the view 
that responsibility is compatible with determinism – that do indeed appear to undercut 
black box responsibilitarianism at the theoretical level in that they render its reactions 
either morally arbitrary or conceptually unsound. The first of these versions of 
compatibilism is characterized by being non-distributive and non-punitive in its 
implications (section III), the second is defined by its concern with forward-looking 
social regulation (section IV), while the third is a restricted version of the social 
 6 
regulation view (section V). I respond to the problems posed by these accounts by 
defending ‘grey box responsibilitarianism’ – that is, a position that rules certain 
accounts of responsibility inadmissible on the ground that, even if they were correct, 
they could not justify punishment or reward on responsibilitarian grounds. The 
specific form of grey box responsibilitarianism that I defend responds only to 
exercises of responsibility that satisfy three conditions: they must have punitive or 
distributive consequences according to the account of responsibility in question, they 
must take the form of acts in the past, and they must reflect autonomous agency. 
 
II. Black box responsibilitarianism 
Susan Hurley has noted that, ‘[w]hile the luck-neutralizing [i.e. responsibilitarian] 
account gives responsibility a central role in distributive justice, it has not focused 
much analysis on responsibility itself or on how its structure or character might 
constrain its role within distributive justice’.6 The strategy of writers such as Richard 
Arneson, G. A. Cohen, and Larry Temkin has rather been to bracket off questions 
concerning the correct characterization of responsibility. As Cohen notes, this 
‘subordinates political philosophy to metaphysical questions that may be impossible 
to answer’.7 The intention is to allow discussion about distributive justice to proceed 
fruitfully, with the apparently interminable debates about free will, determinism, and 
related matters consigned to a black box marked ‘responsibility’. 
 On my view the black box approach to responsibility is not that far from being 
the correct one for the responsibilitarian to take. The main consideration in its favour 
is obvious enough, especially when we compare such a strategy to the alternative 
                                                 
6
 Hurley 2003, 1. 
7
 Cohen 1989, 934; see also Arneson 1989; Temkin 1993. 
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‘white box’ strategy.8 This latter strategy is defined by its commitment to a certain 
very specific account of responsibility. A view endorsing this strategy might, for 
instance, combine responsibilitarianism with a particular mechanism-based reason 
view.
9
 It seems clear enough that, at least given the present state of debates about 
responsibility, one endorsing the white box strategy is severely overcommitted. 
Should that very specific account of responsibility – the claim about the contents of 
the box – turn out to be mistaken, the overall view falls with it. The overall view 
would be stuck making arbitrary attributions of responsibility – attributions which are 
based on a particular view of responsibility which has been shown to be wrong. But 
the rightness or wrongness of responsibilitarianism does not turn upon the rightness or 
wrongness of any particular mechanism-based reason view, nor with mechanism-
based reason views as a whole, nor with reason views as a whole, nor even with 
compatibilism. To reject retributivism and luck egalitarianism for such specific 
reasons would be to throw the baby out with the bath water. The black box 
responsibilitarian, by contrast, rejects all such potentially damaging commitments.
10
   
                                                 
8
 In physics, electronics, and computing black boxes are systems or devices which are considered in 
terms of their inputs and outputs, while white boxes (sometimes also known as ‘glass boxes’ or ‘clear 
boxes’) are systems or devices whose inner workings are visible and of interest. Similar ideas are also 
sometimes used in philosophy and social science, especially in discussions of behaviourism. 
9
 See, e.g., Fischer and Ravizza 1998. 
10
 A referee suggests that there may be disadvantages to this lack of commitment: ‘the justice claims 
are really meaningless or inadequate for a practical purpose (and we are in the realm of practical 
philosophy here) unless at least some account of responsibility is forthcoming and correct: staying 
agnostic about which account of responsibility is correct simply renders justice claims based upon 
responsibility opaque as the very condition for such justice claims being made may not be realized’. In 
reply I would point out that, while black box responsibilitarianism does not specify an account of 
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Hurley suggests that ‘[t]he black box of responsibility that luck-neutralizing 
accounts build into the heart of egalitarian justice turns out, when opened, to be 
something of a Pandora’s box’.11 On a superficial reading this might appear to be 
supportive of the black box responsibilitarian’s position: after all, things would have 
been better had Pandora not opened her box. But Hurley’s point is rather that the 
contents of the box, whether opened or not, do not serve the responsibilitarian as well 
as has been supposed. Responsibility has implications for political and (by extension) 
legal philosophy that are quite incompatible with luck egalitarianism and (by 
extension) retributivism. 
The ‘Pandora’s box’ claim is not much developed in Hurley’s book.12 We 
might nevertheless ask what these implications so problematic for responsibilitarians 
might be. The following possible claims present themselves: 
 
(1) Libertarianism is true – that is, free will and responsibility are possible and 
incompatible with causal determinism – but since the conditions for libertarian 
responsibility (e.g. the presence of ‘contra-causal freedom’13) are rarely 
satisfied, responsible acts are very unusual. 
                                                                                                                                            
responsibility in advance, that does not mean that it lacks an account of responsibility at any given 
time. It simply endorses whichever account of responsibility is presently best justified. At any given 
moment it therefore has just as much content as white box responsibilitarianism, and can give just as 
much distributive or retributive guidance in practice. (Elsewhere I have suggested that a ‘responsibility 
committee’ of professional philosophers might provide their best guess about responsibility to a luck 
egalitarian government’s distributive arm; see Knight 2006.) 
11
 Hurley 2003, 3. 
12
 See Watson 2007. 
13
 Campbell 1951. 
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(2) Compatibilism is true – in the sense that free will and responsibility are 
possible and compatible with causal determinism – but since the conditions for 
compatibilist responsibility (e.g. the presence of strong reasons 
responsiveness) are rarely satisfied, responsible acts are very unusual. 
 
(3) Libertarianism is false, so responsibility is impossible. 
 
(4) Hard determinism is true – that is, causal determinism is true and 
incompatible with free will and responsibility – so responsibility is impossible. 
 
(5) Regressive control – control not only of one’s act, but also of the causes of 
one’s act – is required for responsibility, and since regressive control is 
impossible, responsibility is impossible. 
 
The non-empirical components of (1) and (2) do not appear to be at odds with black 
box responsibilitarianism. Indeed, if we take the metaphysical and moral claims of (1) 
and (2) in isolation from the empirical claims, we have support for that position. Do 
the empirical claims undermine it? Surely not. The black box responsibilitarian claims 
only that where responsibility is present – where the output of the black box has a 
certain character – a certain institutional response is appropriate. It says nothing about 
how often responsibility actually is present – nothing, that is, about the frequency of 
that certain kind of output.  
That is not to say that implications (1) and (2) would be irrelevant to practical 
problems, were they to hold. They might be used to ground a specific form of the 
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arbitrariness of attribution objection. It might be maintained that, while it is possible 
for someone to be responsible for a criminal act, the kind of cases in which persons 
are routinely held responsible for criminal acts are not actually cases involving 
responsible action. At its most specific, this sort of objection might consist simply in 
pointing out that the real world facts about responsibility are not as the retributivist 
claims them to be. A slightly more generalized form of the specific objection would 
deploy a genuinely responsibility-sensitive form of retributivism against a less 
demanding, more conventional form of retributivism. It could be pointed out, not that 
what the opposing retributivist says is present is not present, but rather that this 
protagonist is concerned with the presence or absence of the wrong kind of thing – 
with the mere appearance of responsibility. The present point is that both kinds of 
objection would find traction where claims (1) and (2) – or weaker claims, suggesting, 
for example, that satisfaction of the conditions for responsibility is less common than 
social institutions appear to suppose – are true, since their truth might undermine 
justifications of retributivist practices. Of course, parallel points could be made about 
luck egalitarian practices, were they present. 
Only a general arbitrariness of attribution objection can undermine black box 
responsibilitarianism. (3) appears to be sufficiently general. Although such a stark and 
contentious claim is not often articulated nowadays, it has sometimes been suggested 
that a refutation of libertarianism would be sufficient refutation of 
responsibilitarianism, on the ground that libertarianism is required to maintain the key 
responsibilitarian distinction between those things for which we are responsible and 
those things for which we are not responsible.
14
 But while maintaining that 
                                                 
14
 The legendary American trial lawyer Clarence Darrow often criticized retributive laws from a 
determinist perspective, asserting that ‘every scientific man knows … that the whole current conception 
 11 
libertarianism is false is a perfectly consistent position, it does not at all imply that 
free will and (hence) responsibility are impossible, since free will and responsibility 
may be compatible with determinism, as compatibilism holds.
15
 It is more generous, 
then, to read such critics of responsibilitarianism as really endorsing (4) or (5).
16
 
The first of these views is the traditional one for sceptics about responsibility 
to take. If hard determinism is true, it follows that reward and punishment (and, for 
that matter, praise and blame) cannot be based on responsibility. By contrast, (5) is a 
form of scepticism about free will and responsibility that has particularly come to 
prominence in the wake of ‘Frankfurt examples’ and other apparent demonstrations of 
the dissociability of responsibility and the ability to do otherwise.
17
 Since the ability 
to do otherwise is often thought to be ruled out by causal determinism, this 
dissociability appears to undermine the threat that determinism poses to 
responsibility. But it does nothing to undermine the thought that control of the 
ultimate causes of one’s acts is required for responsibility. Consequently, some 
philosophers have suggested that the gravest threat to responsibility is now the 
                                                                                                                                            
of the individual and his responsibility is a gross error’ (Darrow 2004, 20). In the mid-twentieth century 
similarly sweeping deterministic arguments against legal responsibility were advanced by writers of a 
scientific background (Slater 1954; MacDonald 1955), and the law’s rejection of determinism continues 
to trouble some (Hill 1988; Coffey 1993). For nuanced criticism of luck egalitarianism along broadly 
the same lines see Scheffler 2003; 2005. 
15
 Causal indeterminism is often thought to be as much of a barrier to libertarian free will as 
determinism. No violence would be done to the argument of the paper were the definitions of 
libertarianism and compatibilism revised to refer to free will and responsibility’s (in)compatibility with 
both determinism and indeterminism.   
16
 Or, indeed, (6). See the next section. 
17
 Frankfurt 1969. 
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regression requirement, for responsibility is impossible where its necessary conditions 
include the agent being responsible for causes temporally located prior to her birth.
18
 
While proof of (4), (5), or other strongly sceptical claims about 
responsibility
19
 would have wide reaching practical implications for black box 
responsibilitarianism, it would not undermine the position, since that position holds 
only that where responsibility is present, appropriate reward and punishment ought to 
follow. Knowing that responsibility is never present would tell us how to apply 
retributivism or luck egalitarianism – specifically, by telling us not to punish or 
reward apparently responsible acts. Such knowledge might, then, give us grounds for 
criticizing existing practices done in the name of responsibility. But it would do 
nothing to undermine responsibilitarianism as a theory, since there would be no 
dissonance between this knowledge and the position. ‘Reward or punish those who 
satisfy W’, where W denotes whatever substantive conditions for responsibility are 
specified in the box, is just as plausible as a moral, legal, and political principle where 
no prima facie responsible acts are in fact responsible as it is where many or all such 
acts are responsible.  
It might be thought that it would hardly be worth defending black box 
responsibilitarianism where strongly sceptical claims about responsibility are proven 
beyond a shadow of a doubt, as it has the same prescriptions in such circumstances as 
views that do not refer to responsibility. The point, however, is that black box 
responsibilitarianism is no less plausible than responsibility-insensitive views even 
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 For discussion see Hurley 2003, pt. I. 
19
 These include ‘hard incompatibilism’ claims to the effect that responsibility is impossible if 
determinism is true, and (given the available evidence) impossible if indeterminism is true; see G. 
Strawson 1986; Pereboom 2001. 
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under such extreme conditions, and if we return to more likely circumstances, where 
strongly sceptical claims are far from proven, it is at a significant advantage relative 
to responsibility-insensitive positions, which can take no account of the moral 
significance of responsibility. Black box responsibilitarianism does not make 
attributions of responsibility arbitrarily, as white box responsibilitarianism does, and it 
does not arbitrarily (that is, without reference to the metaphysics and morals of 
responsibility) refuse to make attributions of responsibility, as responsibility-
insensitive views appear to. 
 
III. Opening the box, part 1: non-distributive, non-punitive compatibilism 
There are further possibilities that show that the black box responsibilitarian’s lack of 
commitment is not always an advantage. The first is represented by this further claim: 
 
(6) Compatibilism is true, and responsibility only justifies non-distributive,  
non-punitive reactive attitudes of praise and blame.  
 
Some writers have argued that a luck egalitarianism grounded in compatibilism might 
be mistaken not because compatibilism is wrong, but rather because responsibility 
grounded in compatibilism stops short of justifying inequalities in holdings.
20
 This 
limitation would be equally problematic for retributivism. If one’s responsibility for 
some criminal act is only appropriate grounds for censure, rather than, say, 
incarceration or financial penalty, retributivism would have to undergo a thorough 
overhaul or be abandoned altogether.  
                                                 
20
 Fleurbaey 1995; cf. Scanlon 1998, ch. 6. 
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One might try to maintain a form of retributivism by replacing the usual 
punishments with public humiliation and other more subtle tools. This might in part 
be achieved by bringing existing collateral consequences of criminal convictions 
within the ambit of sentencing (an objective already being pursued in some 
jurisdictions for quite different reasons). Similarly, one might try to maintain 
distinctively luck egalitarian policies by using praise and blame as tools. This would 
be most promising as a strategy for welfarist luck egalitarians. It is possible, then, that 
the truth of (6)-type claims would not be fatal for black box responsibilitarian 
accounts. Even so, it is clear that it would have a significant impact on such accounts. 
In what follows in this section I assume that responsibilitarianism is not made non-
punitive and non-distributive, as I am sure that most retributivists and luck 
egalitarians would not want to see their positions so severely restricted. 
The most pressing point for the present argument is that the possibility of 
claim (6) shows that, just as white box responsibilitarianism is overcommitted, the 
black box view is undercommitted. ‘Reward or punish those who satisfy W’, where W 
denotes whatever substantive conditions for responsibility are specified in the black 
box, is an insufficiently discriminating formula, since responsibility may sometimes 
be present, but reward or punishment, at least by the usual means, quite out of order. 
If an account is simply concerned with the presence or absence of responsibility in 
particular individual acts, with no regard to how exactly those acts are responsible, it 
is open to the danger that its distributive or punitive response is inappropriate for that 
kind of responsibility. In other words, the attribution of responsibility may be sound, 
but the reaction arbitrary from a moral point of view.  
The relationship between this question of appropriateness and the question of 
proportionality is an interesting one. Any form of responsibilitarianism has to grapple 
 15 
with the question of what a proportionate response to a given responsible act is. It 
may provide a metric by which acts can be measured, probably taking into account (a) 
the extent of individuals’ responsibility for those acts and (b) the extent of the good 
and bad things the acts bring into being. This metric will then be paired with a list 
indicating which benefits and burdens are appropriate for each act, with the benefit or 
burden being greater, the greater the goodness or badness of the consequences of the 
responsible act. But the response that follows from such an approach to 
proportionality will fail to take into account the prohibition on reward and punishment 
implied by (6). (6) suggests that rewards and punishments of certain familiar sorts 
may be inappropriate responses to responsible acts even where reward or punishment 
have been designed to be in proportion with the goodness or badness of the acts’ 
consequences. This is because (6) says that praise and blame are the only appropriate 
responses however good or bad a responsible act’s consequences may be. 
Non-distributive, non-punitive compatibilism need not be identified as such by 
its proponents in order for responsibilitarian responses to it to be inappropriate. 
Consider, for instance, the Strawsonian view, according to which reactive attitudes 
and practices are themselves constitutive of responsibility.
21
 While it may be true, as 
Peter Strawson holds, that we cannot (rationally) divest ourselves of reactive attitudes 
no matter which theoretical considerations are brought to bear, we can (rationally) 
alter our reactive practices such that they roughly comport with theoretical 
considerations, at least within a certain broad range of such considerations. In other 
words, the Strawsonian view of responsibility may be correct as regards reactive 
attitudes, but at the same time be an inappropriate basis for significant reward or 
penalty where theoretical considerations (both metaphysical and moral) militate 
                                                 
21
 P. Strawson 1974. 
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against our attitudes. Whether or not such a limitation is acknowledged by any 
particular Strawsonian – or, indeed, by Strawson himself22 – does not affect the fact 
that the responsibilitarian should pay heed.
23
 The point has general application: any 
compatibilism that establishes a form of responsibility that only has non-distributive, 
non-punitive implications cannot be a sound basis for luck egalitarian or retributive 
responses.
24
 
The above discussion suggests that the responsibilitarian requires a position 
that says more about the relevant kind of responsibility than the black box view, but 
less about it than the white box view. I will call this position grey box 
responsibilitarianism. For the moment let us stipulate that this position simply adds to 
black box responsibilitarianism the condition that the kind of responsibility required 
by luck egalitarianism or retributivism is the kind that has distributive or punitive 
responses. It modifies the responsibilitarian formula so it reads ‘reward or punish 
                                                 
22
 Paul Russell observes that, ‘[a]ccording to Strawson, our reactive attitudes and retributive practices 
are intimately (i.e. naturally or ‘humanly’) connected. In [“Freedom and Resentment”], however, 
Strawson has very little to say about the problem of punishment as it arises within the framework of his 
naturalistic account of responsibility’ (Russell 1992, 297-8 n. 11; see also P. Strawson 1974, 22). 
Strawson is similarly unforthcoming on questions of distributive justice.   
23
 The limitation may, however, be unnecessary on a variant of Strawsonian theory which ‘holds that 
morally responsible agents are not just those who, as a matter of practice, are recipients of the reactive 
attitudes; rather agents are morally responsible if and only if they are appropriate recipients – that is, 
they are rationally accessible to the reactive attitudes’ (Fischer and Ravizza 1993, 18, original 
emphasis; see also Fischer 1986; Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 5-8).  
24
 The implications of this may be very wide-ranging indeed given some writers’ ‘worry … that even 
if the compatibilist is successful, the kind of responsibility that can be rescued is not the kind that is 
needed; it is not responsibility in the fully-fledged sense we need to be confident when the 
consequences for someone (perhaps ourselves) might be very grave’ (Matravers 2007, 63). 
 17 
those who satisfy X’, where X denotes whatever substantive conditions for punitive or 
distributive responsibility are specified in the black box. X-type conditions are on the 
whole more demanding than W-type conditions, where W just denotes whatever 
substantive conditions for responsibility are specified in the ‘black box’. X-type 
conditions will include W-type conditions, but they may also include further 
conditions not required by one concerned only with praising and blaming. The move 
to grey box responsibilitarianism constitutes a partial opening (or ‘greying’) of the 
box of responsibility, since we are now concerned not only with whether there is 
responsibility, but also with whether it is of a certain sort – admittedly, still a very 
broad sort.  
Although the move to X-type conditions might seem an obvious one to make, 
it is not one familiar from the literature on luck egalitarianism. This is most likely 
because luck egalitarians have not considered the possibility that (some kinds of) 
responsibility might only justify praise and blame, or alternatively because they have 
considered that possibility but rejected it as implausible. I will not in this paper 
directly address this latter claim.
25
 That task seems unnecessary, especially since there 
are additional cases in which both black box responsibilitarianism and grey box 
responsibilitarianism, as stated thus far, appear to fall down. 
 
IV. Opening the box, part 2: socially-regulative compatibilism  
A stock compatibilist position makes something like the following claim:  
 
                                                 
25
 I argue in favour of it in Knight 2006. There I also suggest that even if (6)-type claims were true, 
they would not undermine luck egalitarianism, but I do so without explicitly distinguishing between 
black box and grey box strategies as I do here.  
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(7) Compatibilism is true, and it is a sufficient condition for compatibilist 
responsibility that good effects issue from the ascription of responsibility. 
 
Several writers have endorsed a ‘social regulation’, ‘economy of threats’, ‘effect 
compatibilist’, or ‘hard compatibilist’ view of responsibility.26 As the latter names 
suggests, this view endorses determinism, and denies that this is any impediment to 
responsibility; but it also (typically) denies that free will is possible. It is further 
distinguished from other compatibilist views by its hard-nosed focus on the 
consequences of holding persons responsible. J. J. C. Smart, for instance, maintains 
that, while some of our commonplace ascriptions of responsibility do presuppose 
libertarian freedom, many ordinary notions of responsibility can be salvaged if we 
drop such metaphysical pretensions and instead justify them on pragmatic grounds. If 
a schoolboy fails to do his homework, whether we ascribe responsibility to him or not 
ought to depend, as intuitively it should, on the reason for his failure (laziness or 
stupidity, say). But this is for no reason other than that it can indicate whether blame 
and punishment can make his compliance more likely in the future. 
 Socially-regulative compatibilism should be distinguished from views which 
make comparable prescriptions, but for different reasons. Barbara Wootton is well 
known for her view that criminal justice should be orientated towards social 
protection rather than punishing the wicked, and that this is best realized by extending 
strict criminal liability and considering mens rea only after conviction in order to 
                                                 
26
 The terms are from Watson 2004a, Arneson 2003, Smilansky 2000, and Wallace 1994, ch. 3, 
respectively. Hobbes, Mill, and Sidgwick all subscribed to a version of this view. Modern statements of 
it include Smart 1961; Schlick 1966; Hobart 1966; Dennett 1984.  
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establish the best way of correcting harmful behaviour.
27
 But while the policy here is 
similar to that of a socially regulative compatibilist such as Smart, it is not premised 
on any view about the truth of causal determinism and its compatibility with practices 
of holding people responsible. Indeed, Wootton is explicitly uncommitted on the truth 
of causal determinism,
28
 and rebuked H. L. A. Hart for his continued emphasis on 
punishment, in spite of his endorsement of the goal of social protection.
29
 Some have 
read the core of John Rawls’ position that there is no prejusticial notion of desert or 
responsibility as being, like Wootton’s, purely moral and quite detachable from 
metaphysical claims.
30
 Even the alternative interpretation of Rawls as basing his 
‘justice as fairness’ on determinism does not paint him as a socially regulative 
compatibilist, but rather as a hard determinist.
31
 I do not, then, believe that either 
Wootton or Rawls provide or even intend to provide a full account of how people can 
be responsible, so the present question – which accounts of responsibility, when 
combined with responsibilitarianism, result in arbitrary distributive and punitive 
reactions? – does not arise.         
The social regulation view may appear to be promising for the grey box 
responsibilitarian in that it offers the prospect of reconciling responsibility practices 
with a naturalistic understanding of the world. In other ways, however, it seems quite 
inhospitable. Indeed, responsibilitarianism and socially-regulative compatibilism are 
                                                 
27
 Wootton 1963, 46-51. 
28
 Wootton 2003, 119-28. 
29
 Wootton 1963, 45-6; See Hart 1968. 
30
 See Matravers 2010, sec. 3. Of course, in later work (1993), Rawls has proclaimed his revised 
position to be ‘political not metaphysical’, but the present suggestion is that even in A Theory of Justice 
Rawls does not have metaphysical commitments specifically regarding free will and determinism. 
31
 Craig 1975, 72; Smilansky 2003; cf. Rawls 1999. 
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commonly viewed as incompatible. Moritz Schlick’s especially forthright defence of 
his version of the view describes the conflict with retributivism quite clearly. 
According to the social regulation view, ‘punishment is concerned only with the 
institution of causes, of motives of conduct, and this alone is its meaning’.32 On this 
view, punishment is purely an ‘educative measure’, and ‘[t]he question of who is 
responsible is the question concerning the correct point of application of the 
motive’.33 While Schlick notes that punishment is often viewed as ‘a natural 
retaliation for a past wrong’, he dismisses the idea that ‘an increase in sorrow can be 
“made good again” by further sorrow’ as ‘altogether barbarous’. Richard Arneson, a 
prominent luck egalitarian, is more measured, though equally uncompromising on the 
question of compatibility: 
 
The [social regulation] theory of responsibility rejects the idea that individuals are 
ever truly virtuous or vicious. Nor can they be responsible or irresponsible for what 
they do in any deep sense …  This being so, it is not intrinsically morally valuable 
that the virtuous and responsible enjoy good fortune to a greater extent than the 
vicious and irresponsible. … If there were virtue or truly responsible choice or true 
desert, it might be morally a good idea to reward it, but since these concepts have no 
application, in effect the virtue and responsibility and desert rankings of any person 
are always the same as anyone else’s, so moral principles that specify that the good 
and bad fortune that people get should vary with the moral quality of their choices 
have no application.
34
  
 
                                                 
32
 Schlick 1966, 60. 
33
 Schlick 1966, 61. 
34
 Arneson 2003, 250. 
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In my view there is no conceptual problem with applying grey box 
responsibilitarianism as stated thus far (or, for that matter, black box 
responsibilitarianism) to a situation in which the social regulation view is (perceived 
to be) correct. Although Arneson is right to state that the latter view rejects notions of 
true virtue and viciousness, it does not reject the notion of responsibility; rather, it 
seeks to explain that notion, albeit in unusual terms. The operative sense of 
responsibility is not metaphysically deep, but it is intended to be morally significant. 
While virtue and desert rankings must be identical for all persons, they are irrelevant 
to responsibilitarianism (except, perhaps, insofar as they overlap with or are indicators 
of responsibility rankings). Even if every person’s responsibility rankings were 
identical, responsibilitarianism would still be applicable. That application would yield 
equalities of outcome, but for responsibilitarian reasons.
35
 Consequently, 
responsibilitarianism can be applied, and in such a way that rewards and punishments 
vary interpersonally on responsibility grounds. Where rewarding or punishing a 
person will affect their and/or others’ future behaviour beneficially, the social 
regulation view says both that they can be rewarded, punished, praised or blamed on 
that basis, and that that basis is a matter of responsibility. Rewarding or punishing a 
different person may have different effects, in which case different ascriptions of 
responsibility and (on the grounds of the resulting interpersonal responsibility 
differential) assignments of rewards or punishments will be appropriate. The social 
regulation view is, then, a possible bedfellow of responsibilitarianism, though it 
would be a strange one.  
                                                 
35
 To my knowledge Arneson was in fact the first to recognize this important point, albeit in the 
different hypothetical context of hard determinism being true; see Arneson 1989. 
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It may be noted in passing that, while the social regulation view and 
responsibilitarianism appear to be consistent with each other, they are also doubly 
dissociable. That responsibilitarianism is not committed to the social regulation view 
is evident enough. That the social regulation view is not committed to 
responsibilitarianism is less obvious. It is illustrated by the possibility of one 
endorsing the position that the social regulation view of responsibility is correct, but 
that it should not have distributive or punitive consequences. In other words, one 
might hold that ascriptions of responsibility depend on the positive effects (especially 
incentive effects) such ascriptions would have, but that these ascriptions of 
responsibility only justify reactive attitudes of praise or blame. Naturally, the 
restricted implications of responsibility here will affect the ascriptions of 
responsibility themselves, since (mere) praising and blaming is likely to have effects 
other than those of rewarding and punishing. This non-distributive, non-punitive 
version of the social regulation view is rarely, if ever, considered in the literature, 
probably because the social regulation view is often assumed to be bound up with 
utilitarianism or other consequentialist positions that are resistant to prohibitions on 
distributive responses.   
Socially-regulative compatibilism and grey box responsibilitarianism, as they 
have been stated thus far, are, it seems, doubly dissociable but harmonious. However, 
there remains a strong case for modifying the latter such that it precludes the former. 
Arneson’s claim that responsibility rankings do not vary under socially-regulative 
compatibilism is both mistaken and, strictly speaking, irrelevant. Rewarding or 
punishing those who satisfy the bare, W-type responsibility conditions or the more 
discriminating X-type conditions, where these are set on grounds of social regulation, 
just means rewarding or punishing where this has the best consequences. This is not a 
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mistake for moral reasons, as black box responsibilitarian reward or punishment on 
the basis of claim (6) would be. The mistake is more a conceptual one. Application of 
the social regulation view reveals that neither black box nor grey box 
responsibilitarianism in fact captures the intuitive rationale for responsibilitarianism – 
that persons’ treatment ought to be decided by reference to what they have (or have 
not) actually done. It might be right to ascribe responsibility, and allocate the 
associated rewards and punishments, solely for the end of bringing about better 
actions (ones more conducive to total utility levels, say). But that can only be the case 
if responsibilitarianism is wrong; that is, if the goodness or badness of the things 
people have brought about is irrelevant to their treatment. If responsibilitarianism 
allows responsibility to be defined in social regulatory fashion, it risks becoming a 
mere derivative of utilitarianism or whichever other forward-looking consequentialist 
view guides social regulation. The reference to responsibility would add nothing that 
was not already present in the foundational consequentialism; it would be a mere 
linguistic remnant, and since it would be purely forward looking, one somewhat at 
odds with ordinary language at that.  
The situation here would be quite different to that where (4) or (5) are true. In 
those cases the black box and grey box approaches recognize that responsibility can 
play no retributive or distributive role. By contrast, if the social regulation view is 
held to be one possible account of responsibility for retributive and distributive 
purposes, these approaches allow the pretence of rewarding or punishing on the basis 
of responsibility, even though the moral load is in fact carried elsewhere – by 
reference to consequences. This is a recipe for conceptual confusion. 
To illustrate, suppose that I have just composed a particularly inspiring 
orchestral piece. If attributed to me the work would likely start me on a reasonably 
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lucrative musical career. However, my march does have a certain resemblance to the 
compositions of Edward Elgar, and all things considered social consequences would 
be better were it accepted as his great long lost work. For one thing, its uplifting tones 
will receive a wider hearing if they are attributed to a more famous composer than I. It 
seems uncontroversial, then, that the social regulation view holds that I am not 
responsible for the work, and so should not be congratulated or rewarded for it. 
Furthermore, it holds that Elgar is responsible for the work, even though he was dead 
when its creation was initiated; posthumous praise and awards may even be in order, 
if the piece is sufficiently meritorious. Would responsibilitarianism really agree with 
such judgments if it turned out that socially-regulative compatibilism was our best 
chance of salvaging responsibility? On some combination of metaphysical and moral 
facts it may be the case that I am not responsible for bringing this music into being, 
and responsibilitarianism may adjust my entitlement accordingly. But 
responsibilitarianism can not hold that Elgar is entitled to anything – even so much as 
a good word around the dinner table – on account of the creation of this march. 
As the above example shows, on the social regulation view someone’s 
performance of an act is itself an irrelevance as regards responsibility. For this reason, 
the social regulation view does not in any fundamental way recognize the notion of 
being responsible for some thing, and it is hence incapable of filling out the 
responsibilitarian formula ‘those who are responsible for some thing ought to be 
rewarded or punished according to the goodness or badness of that thing’. As a guide 
to policy it is forward looking, and is therefore quite unable to shed light on 
backwards-looking positions such as retributivism and luck egalitarianism.
36
 For these 
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 One could deny this apparent conflict between backward- and forward-looking views by drawing 
attention to Rawls’ suggestion that ‘one must distinguish between justifying a practice as a system of 
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reasons it is not enough for responsibilitarianism to state that the kind of 
responsibility in question justifies legal or political responses. We need to further 
open up the box of responsibility or, to mix metaphors, make it a lighter shade of 
grey. The appropriate version of grey box responsibilitarianism requires that we 
‘reward or punish those who satisfy Y’, where Y denotes whatever substantive 
conditions for punitive or distributive past act-responsibility are specified in the box. 
It is not enough just that any conditions for punitive or distributive responsibility have 
been satisfied; those conditions must also relate to the characteristics of a past act, 
rather than to the characteristics of future acts. Just as a person can be punished on 
retributive grounds only where she had the appropriate actus reus and mens rea at 
some temporally prior point, so too can a person be rewarded on luck egalitarian 
grounded only where she previously acted in a certain mental state. 
 
V. Opening the box, part 3: restricted socially-regulative compatibilism  
The social regulation view often fails to coincide with our ordinary practices and 
understandings of responsibility.
37
 We have seen that one type of case in particular 
gives rise to significantly counterintuitive responses. Where an individual has not 
performed an act, but good effects will follow from holding her responsible, the social 
regulation theorist appears to recommend such a response. More emotive examples 
than the Elgar example are available: a socially regulatory response seems at its most 
                                                                                                                                            
rules to be applied and enforced, and justifying a particular action which falls under these rules; 
utilitarian arguments are appropriate with regard to questions about practices, while retributive 
arguments fit the application of particular rules to particular cases’ (Rawls 1955, p. 5). While it is true 
that this response resolves the conflict, it does so simply by conceding that forward-looking 
utilitarianism is the appropriate guide to policy. This is precisely what responsibilitarianism denies. 
37
 For further demonstration see Bennett 1980; Scanlon 1988; Wallace 1994, 54-9. 
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unacceptable where it constitutes punishment of the indisputably innocent.
38
 This 
seems evidently at odds with retributivism. However, Arneson suggests that socially-
regulative compatibilism can resist such cases on two grounds: first, by incorporating 
individual rights precluding punishment of the innocent; and second, by requiring that 
any individual being held responsible has in fact performed an act.
39
 
Arneson’s first line of resistance essentially grants lexical priority to rights – 
effects only have an influence insofar as this is consistent with rights. To address the 
Elgar example one must extend the line of resistance to encompass rights to the 
recognition of authorship of one’s good works. It may then be observed that serious 
wrongdoers appear to be escaping without punishment in some cases, and that this 
also needs rectification with further rights. In this way the forward-looking character 
of the social regulation view is eroded; indeed, we may define a complete set of rights 
and obligations such that no good or bad acts go without praise, blame, punishment, 
or reward, and effects rarely, if ever, come into the picture, lest rights be violated. 
When socially-regulative compatibilism is restricted so thoroughly it has really 
changed beyond all recognition: our first response to any act will be ordinary 
questions about who performed the act. Furthermore, it has really just become a very 
naïve compatibilist view: it just says that a person having performed a past act is 
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 Smilansky 2000, 28-30. 
39
 Arneson 2003. There is some similarity here with Hart’s position on punishment. He says that 
‘[t]here are values quite distinct from those of retributive punishment which the system of responsibility 
does maintain, and which remain of great importance even if our aims in punishing are the forward 
looking aims of social protection’ (Hart 1968, 180). Thus on Hart’s view, even if we are concerned with 
social regulation, we should still, contra Barbara Wootton (1963), be concerned with punishing 
voluntary acts.  
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sufficient for holding them responsible for that act. A responsibilitarianism based on 
such a view would be subject to the arbitrariness of attribution suggestion. 
As we have seen, the most acceptable (though, for our purposes, ultimately 
fruitless) extension of the first line of resistance holds that it is only ever appropriate 
to hold someone responsible when they performed the act in question, and that 
holding such persons responsible is required in all such cases. The second line of 
resistance rejects the italicized clause. It requires for responsibility that an act has 
been performed, but also that beneficial results issue from holding the actor 
responsible. This restricted socially-regulative compatibilism can be represented by 
this final set of claims: 
 
(8) Compatibilism is true, and the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions 
for compatibilist responsibility are:  
(a) that a person has performed an act; and  
(b) that good effects issue from holding that person responsible for that 
act. 
 
According to (7), identifying someone as responsible is just a matter of 
identifying them as someone whose motives and, hence, future actions can be 
favourably modified through praise, blame, reward, or punishment. (8) gets around 
the obvious shortfall of this position by adding a prior-act condition. This is a 
common restriction on socially-regulative compatibilism; certainly Smart’s example 
assumes that the lazy schoolboy has in fact acted prior to the ascription of 
responsibility and resultant blame and punishment.  
 28 
Restricted socially-regulative compatibilism appears to satisfy grey box 
responsibilitarianism as it has been stated so far. It does specify substantive conditions 
for past-act responsibility – that holding someone responsible for their past act will 
have good consequences – and so it does satisfy the grey box responsibilitarian 
requirement of rewarding or punishing those who satisfy Y, where Y denotes 
whatever substantive conditions for punitive or distributive past act-responsibility are 
specified in the box. However, it still seems unsatisfactory. Consider again my 
classical composition. The past-act restriction ensures that the obviously counter-
responsibilitarian idea of holding Elgar responsible for the composition is prohibited. 
But attribution of the piece to me remains conditional. If social consequences would 
be better if it was widely held that the composer is unknown – perhaps the added 
intrigue will draw listeners – then I have no right to recognition. Again, 
responsibilitarianism accepts the possibility that I am not responsible for my 
composition (hard determinism might be true, regressive control might be required, 
my autonomy may be undermined locally, etc.), but it does not accept the possibility, 
on which the restricted social regulation view insists, that (for its purposes) my 
responsibility might be undermined by a favourable public response to doubt over the 
composer’s identity. It responds to the goodness or badness of what someone has 
done, not the goodness or badness of the effects of someone being held responsible 
for what they have done. If more ambitious accounts of responsibility fail, and social 
regulation (restricted or not restricted) is all we can hope to achieve with the concept, 
then it is time for responsibilitarianism to stop referring to it. Conceptual clarity 
requires that responsibilitarianism does not amount to quasi-utilitarianism.  
I suggest, then, this final formulation of grey box responsibilitarianism: that 
we ‘reward or punish those who satisfy Z’, where Z denotes whatever substantive 
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agency conditions for punitive or distributive past act-responsibility are specified in 
the box. This precludes substantive conditions that are not concerned with agency 
(such as ones concerning effects). It reflects the fact that grey box 
responsibilitarianism requires agent responsibility, or attributive responsibility. Both 
lines of resistance open to the social regulation view include limitations to past-acts, 
but they are not sufficiently discriminatory about the kinds of acts at hand. Agent 
responsibility requires that the act is appropriately connected to an exercise of 
autonomous agency. I hope to have given two good reasons why such a specification 
is necessary. First, it is unacceptable for a responsibilitarian that good consequences 
be a necessary condition for a response, even if the presence of a past-act is also a 
necessary condition. Second, that an act was performed in the past by an agent is not 
sufficient to show that it is in any way autonomous, as a responsibilitarian response 
requires. 
The ‘agency conditions’ stipulation of Z may, like the limitation to punitive or 
distributive responsibility, seem like an obvious stipulation to make. But just as in the 
earlier case, it is not a stipulation widely made in the luck egalitarian literature. To 
some, the past-act stipulation may have seemed sufficient. Ronald Dworkin and John 
Roemer, two theorists often identified as leading luck egalitarians, appear to allow 
that acts only need to have been performed in order for them to be eligible for 
distributive responses. Autonomy only comes into the picture where it is undermined 
by ‘cravings’ (Dworkin) or politically recognized obstacles (Roemer).40 Even writers 
such as Arneson, Cohen, and Temkin, who take care to specify that their views only 
respond to a philosophical sense of responsibility, tend not to specify that they are 
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 See Dworkin 1981 and Roemer 1993 respectively. 
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talking about agent responsibility.
41
 Arneson is quite explicit that luck egalitarianism 
might respond to non-agent responsibility. I hope to have shown some of the 
difficulties associated with leaving responsibilitarianism – especially luck 
egalitarianism – underspecified in this way.42 
 
VI. Conclusion 
I have argued that a white box responsibilitarian strategy which precisely defines 
responsibility is overcommitted, for responsibilitarianism does not stand or fall with 
any particular conception of responsibility (section II). It is therefore subject to the 
arbitrariness of attribution objection. By contrast, responsibilitarian views such as 
black box responsibilitarianism which largely leave the issue of defining 
responsibility to metaphysicians and moral philosophers are undercommitted as some 
conceptions of responsibility do not provide appropriate grounds for reward or 
punishment, leaving responsibilitarianism open to the arbitrariness of reaction 
objection (section III), while other conceptions of responsibility do not provide 
appropriate grounds for specifically responsibilitarian reward or punishment (sections 
IV and V). 
The account defended here, grey box responsibilitarianism, steers a path 
between the two by defining some of the substance of the conceptions of 
responsibility that may serve as grounds for reward and punishment, but not so much 
as to give a hostage to the fortune of any particular conception of responsibility. The 
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 See, e.g., Arneson 1989; Cohen 1989; Temkin 1993. 
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 It is also possible, of course, to over-specify luck egalitarianism. In later work, Cohen arguably does 
just this, by building conditions into his ‘equal access to advantage’ that should, if they are to be 
accommodated at all, be built into the account of responsibility to which luck egalitarianism responds; 
see Cohen 2004; Knight 2009b.  
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relevant conceptions of responsibility are both non-arbitrary grounds for distributive 
or punitive reaction and within the conceptual parameters of responsibilitarianism. 
Specifically, grey box responsibilitarianism requires that we only reward or punish on 
the basis of distributively or punitively relevant past-act agent responsibility.
43
  
I have explained why some accounts of responsibility that fail to satisfy these 
requirements cannot serve responsibilitarianism. The problematic accounts appear to 
be those that are moderately sceptical: sceptical, in that they doubt whether persons 
are genuinely meritorious or demeritorious in the way required by traditional views of 
responsibility, but moderate in that they do not take this as grounds for doubting that 
persons can be (held) responsible. The explanation for this is quite simple. 
Responsibilitarianism is largely motivated by the idea that persons can be responsible 
in the sense of being genuinely meritorious or demeritorious, but as we have seen it 
has no difficulty responding appropriately to an absence of responsibility (be it local 
or global). Problems arise where the disconnection between the motivation – which 
appeals to a particular class of conceptions of responsibility – and the barebones 
definition of responsibilitarianism – which refers to responsibility simpliciter – is 
exposed. Where there is responsibility of the shallower variety endorsed by the 
moderate sceptic, responsibilitarian distribution lacks motivation and is no longer true 
to the guiding ideals of responsibilitarianism.  
Within the confines of this paper I have not of course been able to survey 
those accounts of compatibilism and libertarianism that do satisfy the requirements. In 
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 The ‘past-act’ component of the ‘past-act agent responsibility’ formulation may seem superfluous to 
some. However, the bare idea of agent responsibility is not explicitly tied to past acts. Some views of 
responsibility may fill out the idea of agent responsibility with a connection between hypothetical acts 
and exercises of autonomous agency. Since responsibilitarianism does not respond to such 
responsibility, my formulation seems appropriate.   
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general, these can be expected to be those that retain something like the traditional 
conception of responsibility, and reject even the limited scepticism of the moderate 
sceptic. There may also be additional views that are inimical to responsibilitarianism. 
Some of these views may be filtered out by the grey box account described here, but 
others may necessitate further conditions for the kind of responsibility of interest to 
responsibilitarians. For instance, some accounts of responsibility may appeal to a 
form of autonomous agency that is inadequate for responsibilitarian purposes. The 
box of responsibility may need to be opened a little more.  
I have also not explained how responsibilitarians assess the distributive or 
punitive value of responsibility. Sometimes the agent may be responsible for 
something which does not require a distributive or punitive response. In that case the 
‘reward or punishment’ has a value of zero (zero units of resources, zero years in 
prison, etc.). In other cases the act is good or bad in a way that requires a distributive 
or punitive response. The issue of identifying such cases, and establishing the class 
and magnitude of the reward or punishment, is distinct from the question addressed 
here – that is, what we might be responsible for in responsibilitarian terms – but of 
equal importance.
44
 
We can take the grey box position without insisting that non-distributive, non-
punitive compatibilism or socially-regulative compatibilism of either form are wrong. 
Maybe it is never right to punish or reward on grounds of responsibility, though one 
may praise or blame on such grounds. Alternatively, maybe the right thing to do, all 
things considered, is to treat Elgar as the composer of the piece I have written if that 
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 The distinction drawn here is similar to those between appraisability and liability in Zimmerman 
1988, and attributability and accountability in Watson 2004b. For discussion of assigning consequences 
to responsible choices see Dekker 2009; Knight 2009a, ch. 5. 
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has the best social effects. If the only existent kind of responsibility was the non-
distributive, non-punitive sort or the socially regulatory sort, the responsibilitarian 
would simply say that the kind of responsibility with which they are (or rather, would 
be) concerned does not exist. In both cases the situation for the grey box 
responsibilitarian is, to all intents and purposes, the same as that where hard 
determinism is true: reward or punishment on the basis of responsibility is always 
inappropriate. But we would still have been right to hold that, insofar as 
responsibilitarianism bases distributions and punishments on responsibility, it 
responds only to full-blown, retributive and/or distributive responsibility, and only to 
such responsibility grounded in past acts, not future effects. Grey box 
responsibilitarianism recognizes legal and political implications of different 
conceptions of responsibility in a way that black box responsibilitarianism and non-
responsibilitarian views such as utilitarianism or outcome egalitarianism do not. 
The foregoing arguments will seem very abstract, and quite removed from 
legal and political realities. But the acceptance of grey box responsibilitarianism could 
have decisive impacts on people’s lives in the event that retributivism or luck 
egalitarianism were accepted as guiding principles for major institutions of society, as 
their proponents would like them to be. For instance, socially-regulative 
compatibilism allows that people may be imprisoned, or for that matter have the 
welfare state’s protections pulled from under them in the event of unemployment, ill 
health or disability, merely because such measures serve the wider interests of society. 
If socially-regulative compatibilism is a good conception of responsibility, black box 
responsibilitarianism does not have the means to deny that these measures further 
retributive or luck egalitarian goals. But grey box responsibilitarianism can deny that, 
and so alert us to the fact that such harsh treatment may be criticized not only from 
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the perspective of fairness but also from that of individual responsibility. In an age 
when political discourse increasingly urges that people are accountable for how they 
live their lives, it is more important than ever that we insist on demanding conditions 
for responsibility before we reward or punish on its basis: without such conditions the 
disadvantaged are likely to be disadvantaged further, and through no fault of their 
own.
45
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